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• The LTRO has successfully mitigated funding needs and reduced interbank stress, and
has had a significant impact on sovereign bond yields in southern euro-area countries,
and increased southern banks’ government debt holdings, while northern banks have
reduced sovereign exposure.
• The LTRO has had only weak effects on funding for households and non-financial
corporations; credit dynamics remain weak particularly in the southern euro area.
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problems and is made less effective by economic/institutional heterogeneity.
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THE SIZE AND THE NATUREof the two recent Euro-
pean Central Bank repurchase agreements
(repos), the longer-term refinancing operations
(LTROs), call for an assessment of their effective-
ness. The ECB stepped into a dysfunctional inter-
bank market and provided large amounts of
liquidity. The data show that this liquidity was
taken up in particular by banks in countries under
stress. At the same time, a large portion of the
total liquidity increase was parked in the ECB's
deposit facility; this appears to have been done in
the main by northern European banks.
The ECB has replaced the interbank market
between the north and the south of the euro area,
thereby preventing a sudden stop of capital flows.
The LTRO has also led to a decrease in the interest
rates on government bonds in the southern coun-
tries, and the holdings of government securities
have increased significantly in the southern coun-
tries' banking systems, while northern country
banks have significantly reduced their holdings of
government debt. In terms of the credit to the non-
financial corporate and household sectors, no
change in the subdued dynamics in southern
Europe has so far been observed. This may relate
to the low demand for credit because of the ongo-
ing deleveraging in the corporate and household
sectors. Interest rates for households and corpo-
rations have become more heterogeneous across
the euro area and the LTRO has not yet reduced
this heterogeneity. At the same time, nominal
interest rates continue to be low in most southern
euro-area countries.
The overall assessment of the LTRO is therefore
mixed. It has stabilised financial conditions and
the interbank market, but it has not fundamentally
altered credit conditions in southern Europe. Mon-
etary policy cannot solve the underlying structural
problems in the banking system. It cannot provide
the necessary structural reforms or overcome the
shortcomings of the euro area's governance set-
up. Monetary policy is made difficult and less
effective by the existing economic and institu-
tional heterogeneity.
This Policy Contribution provides a detailed
assessment of the effectiveness of the LTROs. We
compare the different steps taken to address the
crisis by the Bank of England, the Federal Reserve
and the ECB, and consider if the three-year LTRO
is having macroeconomic effects. Since 2009, the
Bank of England and the Fed have mostly
responded by purchasing government bonds. This
quantitative easing has been done with the clearly
stated aim of supporting the macroeconomy, as
the traditional response of lowering the interest
rate was constrained by the short-term interest
rate's zero lower bound. The ECB has also relied on
government bond purchases. These, however,
have been much more limited and have been done
with the stated aim of improving the monetary
transmission mechanism, not with the aim of
improving credit conditions. The ECB, instead, has
relied more on its traditional monetary policy
instruments, namely repos. Although the increase
in the overall balance sheet size of all three central
banks is by now similar in size, their composition
therefore differs significantly.
1 WARDING OFF CRISIS
Since summer 2007, the US Federal Reserve, the
Bank of England and the ECB have embarked on a
series of extraordinary initiatives to ward off the
global financial crisis and its repercussions. State-
ments by the respective central bankers, however,
suggested that their aims were not aligned. Both
Fed chairman Ben Bernanke and Bank of England
governor Mervyn King indicated early on that, to
borrow from Clausewitz, they regarded the new
course of action as a continuation of interest rate
policy by other means. Quantitative easing was
intended to affect the yield curve in a situation in
which its lower end had reached the zero bound,
PROPPING UP EUROPE? Jean Pisani-Ferry and Guntram B. Wolffand thereby to stimulate the economy despite the
rigidity of the policy rate (Bernanke, 2009; King,
2009).
Jean-Claude Trichet, however, until the end of his
tenure as ECB president, repeatedly indicated that
the aim of the ECB’s unconventional policy was
not to substitute interest-rate cuts at the zero
bound, but rather to ensure the proper transmis-
sion of interest-rate changes to the non-financial
sector. According to the so-called separation prin-
ciple adopted by the ECB, the goal of its non-stan-
dard measures was not to overcome the zero
bound (and in fact, the policy rate was never
brought to zero) but to substitute for an impaired
interbank market, so that interest-rate policy
impulses could be transmitted to the economy.
The ECB went as far as emphasising that liquidity
initiatives could conceptually be undertaken at
any level of the policy rate. As indicated by Fahr et
al(2011),
“Quantitative easing can be seen as a substi-
tute for conventional policy easing, to be
exploited only once there is no more room for
manoeuvre in policy interest rates [...]. The
[ECB's] enhanced credit support programme was
independent of the level of the MRO [main refi-
nancing operation] rate: it could have been
adopted, thus generating a large expansion of the
ECB’s balance sheet, at any interest rate level.”
This difference in emphasis was consistent with
the ECB's reluctance to embark on wholesale pur-
chases of government bonds, as was done by the
Fed and the Bank of England. Although the ECB in
May 2010 also initiated the purchase of selected
government bonds within the context of the Secu-
rities Market Programme (SMP), it did so only for
limited amounts, with clear reluctance, and with
the aim of improving the monetary policy trans-
mission mechanism in countries where it was
impaired by government bond market tension.
At the end of 2011, however, the ECB embarked on
a large-scale provision of three-year liquidity to
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the banking system. Both the size (almost €1 tril-
lion gross) and the nature of this operation call for
a re-examination of whether the distinction
between the ECB and the Fed/Bank of England is
still valid, or if the ECB has de factojoined the other
two central banks and has since then conducted a
large-scale unconventional monetary stimulus.
On the face of it, the three-year LTRO does not
depart qualitatively from the ECB’s prior actions.
The ECB has provided wholesale liquidity to banks
in a situation in which market indicators were
again indicating mounting tensions on the inter-
bank market. Far from increasing its purchases of
government bonds, the ECB has since December
2011 been phasing out the SMP and reducing pur-
chases. The magnitude of the operation, however,
is such that it is difficult to maintain that it has not
had significant macroeconomic effects.
2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Expressions used since the beginning of the crisis
to characterise the central banks’ extraordinary
actions are confusing:  ‘unconventional policies’,
‘quantitative easing’, ‘qualitative easing’, ‘credit
easing’ are often used as if they were inter-
changeable, or at least little distinguishable.
Central bank actions can be categorised on the
basis of three criteria:
• Whether they involve a departure from the open
market operations routinely conducted by the
central bank. This is a matter of proceduresand
the reference is past behaviour. According to
this criterion a central bank’s operation could
be unconventional because it departs from
standard practice, whereas the same operation
might corresponds to standard practice for
another standard bank and therefore not be
unconventional. For example, the use of repos
was unconventional for the Fed in 2008-09, but
not for the ECB.
• Whether they involve intervention in particular
market segments, eg credit markets or the
‘At the end of 2011, the ECB embarked on a large-scale provision of liquidity to the banking
system. The size and the nature of this operation call raise the question of whether the ECB has
de facto conducted a large-scale unconventional monetary stimulus.’
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government bond market. This is a matter of
targeting of the central bank intervention.
However, intervention in a particular market
segment can be motivated either by concerns
specific to this segment or, in the case of
intervention to affect the yield curve, by overall
macroeconomic objectives. To be specific, the
central bank can purchase government bonds
to ease tensions in a particular market (as
done by the ECB within the SMP framework) or
to shape the yield curve and thereby affect
growth;
• Whether they result in an increase in the cen-
tral bank's balance sheet. This is a matter of
monetary impact. However, whether or not
there is an expansion of base money does not
necessarily matter from the point of view of the
non-financial sector. If the expansion of the
monetary base was simply the counterpart of a
drop in the monetary multiplier, there is no
reason to consider that it has had an impact on
the economy. For example, if the central bank
substitutes for the interbank market to lend
directly to banks, as done at the height of the
2008-09 stress, the expansion in the base
money that takes place should have no impact
beyond the banking system.
This short categorisation indicates that there is no
straightforward way to characterise a central
bank’s policy. Especially, focusing on partial cri-
teria (procedures; markets; or the evolution of
base money) can be misleading because the
same action can have both different motivations
and different impacts. What really matters, and
what in fact underlines the ECB’s separation prin-
ciple is whether extraordinary central bank initia-
tives address problems within the banking sector
with the aim of ensuring its proper functioning and
the proper transmission of interest rate decisions
to the economy, or whether they aim at, and result
in, changes in the financing conditions of non-
financial agents, thereby amounting to monetary
policy moves.
3 THREE POLICIES COMPARED
To compare the policies pursued by the three cen-
tral banks, we start by looking at the policy rates
throughout the crisis period (Figure 1). The timing
and speed of the policy moves differs, the levels
reached also differ, and the ECB was alone in
attempting an early return to normality with its
spring 2011 hikes. But on the whole the three cen-
tral banks followed a broadly similar pattern of a
sharp reduction in response to the deterioration
of the financial situation. It should also be taken
into account that although the ECB policy rate did
not decline below 1 percent, the fixed-rate, full-
allotment liquidity provision pushed the EONIA
(the risk-free overnight rate) below 0.5 percent
between summer 2009 and autumn 2010, and
has done again since the beginning of 2012
(Figure 2).
Figure 1: Policy rates of the Fed, Bank of
England and the ECB, 2005-12
Source: Bruegel based on Bank of England, ECB, Fed.
Figure 2: Euro-area interest rates, 2005-12
Source: Bruegel based on Bundesbank, ECB.
We next compare balance sheets. Here the com-
parison is made difficult by statistical discrepan-
cies and the presence on the central banks’
balance sheets of assets unrelated to monetary
policy but whose valuation may fluctuate over
time, suggesting policy actions that did not take
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1. This type of comparison
was advocated by ECB pres-
ident Mario Draghi in the
introductory statement to a
press conference on 8
March, in which he said that
“The Eurosystem has a very
large volume of assets that
have nothing to do with
monetary policy, eg gold,
foreign exchange reserves,
among other things. If you
compare the ECB’s balance
sheet with that of the Fed-
eral Reserve System or the
Bank of England, the latter
are very lean, they do not
have the same volume of
assets. You have to make
the comparison in terms of
the additional risks caused
by the two LTROs. You have
to compare the ratio of
monetary policy instru-
ments to GDP in the three
different areas of the world”.
2. The Eurosystem is the
monetary authority of the
euro area, comprising the
European Central Bank and
the central banks of coun-
tries using the euro.
decomposition. We distinguish five categories:
1 Lending to financial institutions, mainly within
the framework of repurchase agreements
(repos);
2 Government securities held by the central
banks within the framework of asset purchase
programmes;
3 Non-government securities held within the
framework of asset purchase programmes;
4 Foreign exchange swaps with other central
banks (for the Fed)/foreign currency lending to
domestic institutions (for the Bank of England
and the ECB). 
5 Other assets not elsewhere classified.
The first three categories correspond to the three
main instruments used by central banks during
the current crisis, and they correspond to the
three sets of tools distinguished by Fed chairman
Ben Bernanke in his presentation of the Federal
Reserve’s crisis response (Bernanke, 2009). The
same instruments have to varying degrees also
been used by the other two central banks.
The fourth category is intended to capture the
effect of foreign exchange swaps entered into by
the Fed and its partner central banks with the pur-
pose of providing US dollar liquidity to European
financial institutions.
The fifth category is a residual. For the Fed only,
we include an additional category called ‘Other
operations’ that includes significant programmes
conducted during the financial crisis that are not
easily classifiable as repos or securities pur-
chases but that we want to differentiate from
‘Other assets’.
The Annex gives the correspondence between our
classification and those used by national central
banks for the presentation of their balance sheets.
Figures 4, 5 and 6 on the next page show the evo-
lution of the composition of the central banks’ bal-
ance sheets.
The breakdown of assets highlights significant dif-
ferences in the policies of the Fed and the Bank of
England on one hand, and the ECB on the other:
place. To make the comparison meaningful we first
purged the balance sheet of gold, foreign
exchange reserves and inherited assets that are
not part of monetary operations (such as real
estate and remaining loans to governments)1. The
Annex gives the details. We also normalise by
measuring balance sheets as a proportion of
2007 GDP.
All three central banks have experienced a dra-
matic increase in their assets and liabilities
(Figure 3), and all three exhibit a similar pattern:
massive expansion at the time of the Lehman
shock in September 2008, followed by a stabili-
sation or partial reverse, and further expansion at
a later stage (summer 2010 for the Fed and
autumn 2011 for the Bank of England and the
ECB). The differences are also noteworthy: first,
the initial crisis response was more massive in the
case of the Fed and the Bank of England compared
to the ECB. Second, the ECB balance sheet (which
exhibits spikes corresponding to the introduction
or the termination of liquidity provision schemes)
was on a downward trend until late spring 2011,
by which point the initial expansion had been
almost entirely reversed. Since then however its
balance sheet has expanded dramatically and it
has reached a level close to those reached by the
other two central banks.
Figure 3: Balance sheets of the Fed, Bank of
England and the Eurosystem2in percentage of
2007 GDP, 2007-12
Source: Bruegel based on Bank of England, ECB, Fed.
We next turn to the composition of the asset side
of the balance sheet. In order to find out and com-
pare what accounts for this expansion, and which
instruments were used, we adopt a common
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Figure 4: Assets held by the Federal Reserve,
2007-12 (% GDP)
Figure 5: Assets held by the Bank of England,
2007-12 (% GDP)
Figure 6: Assets held by the Eurosystem, 2007-
12 (% GDP)
Source for Figure 4, 5 and 6: Bruegel based on Fed Cleveland
and FRB Factors (reserves balances); Bank of England; ECB.
• In both the US and the UK, the surge of repo
lending to financial institutions was short-lived.
It took place in response to the disruption of the
interbank market following the Lehman shock
and was unwound during 2009. By the
beginning of 2010 it had either disappeared
entirely (Fed) or been reduced to traditional
proportions (Bank of England), and did not
resume afterward. In the case of the ECB,
however, there were repeated spikes of repo
lending, with a resumption on a massive scale
in December 2011; 
• In the US and the UK, government bonds pur-
chased within the framework of credit easing
or quantitative easing programmes largely sub-
stituted repo operations from 2009 onwards.
At the end of February 2012, these assets
accounted for 103 percent of the increase in
the overall size of the Fed balance sheet since
February 2007, and 116 percent in the UK. In
the euro area, however, the bulk of the increase
took the form of repos operations. These
accounted for 64 percent of the increase in the
size of the balance sheet between February
2007 and February 2012, against 20 percent
for government bonds.
• Other categories of assets represent a rela-
tively minor part of all three balance sheets.
Swaps and dollar liquidity provision repre-
sented a temporarily significant part only in
2008-09. Non-government securities were sig-
nificant only for the Fed and only for a very
short period.
• On the whole, what this comparison indicates
is that by early 2012 all three central banks
had increased the size of their balance sheets
by roughly comparable amounts, but that the
balance sheet compositions were entirely dif-
ferent. Purchases of government bonds
accounted overwhelmingly for the increase in
the US and the UK. Liquidity provision to the
banking system accounted for the largest part
of the increase in the euro area.
By itself this difference is however not necessar-
ily indicative of a difference in the monetary
stance. One interpretation of it is that at end-
2011, the ECB faced severe dysfunction in the
banking system and had no choice but to again
stand in place of the clogged interbank market by
providing large-scale liquidity support to banks.
Another interpretation is that the provision of
cheap, long-term liquidity to banks was a way to
give them an incentive to resume lending to the
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into the interbank market, substituting for it to a
great extent. The use of the ECB deposit facility
shows that banks park liquidity at the ECB in
overnight deposits amounting to almost €800 bil-
lion and there is little evidence that this is changing.
Figure 8: Use of the ECB deposit facility (€bns)
Source: ECB.
Effects have also been very asymmetric. The
degree to which countries’ have accessed ECB liq-
uidity through repos has changed markedly
during the last three years (see Figure 9). Prior to
the more acute phases of the crisis, most liquidity
was provided to banks located in Germany. Their
share has declined dramatically while banks in
countries in trouble have increasingly turned to
the ECB liquidity. The ECB has thus stepped into a
dysfunctional interbank market by increasingly
providing funds to stressed banks in the euro-area
periphery, thereby replacing the outflow of capital
from private sources (see for example Merler and
Pisani-Ferry, 2012b).
Figure 9: Share of Eurosystem refinancing oper-
ations by country (Jan 2007 - Nov 2011)
Source: National central banks and ECB. Note that Emergency
Liquidity Assistance is not included.
non-financial sector (including the government
sector through bond purchases). By itself, the
observation of the composition of the balance
sheet cannot discriminate between these two
interpretations. Finding out which is correct
requires an assessment the impact of policy
actions on non-financial agents.
4 ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF RECENT ECB
ACTION
We now assess the impact of the ECB's actions.
We start by describing the response in the inter-
bank market; we then turn to the impact of the
LTRO on banks’ stock market performances,
before discussing the impact on the real economy
and on the government bond market.
4.1 Interbank market
The ECB LTRO has had a dramatic impact on the inter-
bank market. The Euribor/EONIA swap spread, which
measures the difference between secured and unse-
cured overnight lending, is often used to assess the
stress in interbank lending. Prior to the LTRO, it
exceeded levels reached during the first phase of the
global financial crisis, before the Lehman Brothers
collapse. It has decreased massively since the start
of the LTRO. Determined ECB action was thus
arguably very important for calming the banking
sector and reducing the risk of a major accident.
Figure 7: EURIBOR/EONIA swap spread
Source: Datastream.
At the same time, one should not mistake the
reduction in the interbank stress indicator for an
actual improvement in interbank relations. By
lending massively to banks, the ECB has stepped
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4.2 Impact on banks
The LTRO has at least temporarily solved the acute
funding needs of euro-area banks by providing
abundant liquidity at low rates with lower collat-
eral standards. It has not, however, fundamentally
altered the underlying problems of weak banks.
One way of assessing this is to look at the stock
market value of the banks. If the LTRO has
increased the solvency of banks, their stock
prices should have increased too. In principle, the
low-cost three-year loans offered by the ECB
should be seen by market operators as helpful for
restoring the soundness of the banking system
and thereby boosting bank stocks.
Angeloni and Wolff (2012) look at the normalised
average bank stock-market index (consisting of
the banks located in a given country) since Janu-
ary 2011. The sample consists of those banks
stress-tested in the European Banking Authority's
(EBA) recent stress tests. A clear pattern of the
effects of the ECB’s LTRO cannot be discerned.
Shares have continued to move sideways since
October and seem unaffected by the ECB’s opera-
tions. This result suggests that the ECB helped
ensure the funding of banks but did not address
bank solvency concerns. ECB action has con-
tributed to the financial system’s stability, but has
not helped bank shareholders.
Figure 10: Banks' stock market price indexes
Source: Datastream. Note: Stock market index normalised to
100 for January 2011.
4.3 Pass-through to the real economy
The LTRO has clearly helped to improve the funding
conditions of banks. At the same time, the huge
increase in the deposit facility suggests that
banks still hoard a lot of liquidity at the ECB, even
though this means incurring losses for the bank-
ing system as a whole (liquidity received through
the LTRO costs 1 percent while the deposit facility
only offers 0.25 percent). Confidence has there-
fore not yet returned to the euro-area banking
market. Is there any evidence that the LTRO has
led to an expansion of credit growth to the euro-
area corporate and household sectors?
Growth of credit to non-financial corporations and
to households continues to be very weak and is
falling in the euro area as a whole (Figure 11).
Figure 11 does not suggest that there is yet a
change in the downward credit trend, with annual
credit growth in February 2012 at 0.4 percent for
the non-financial corporate sector and 1.2 percent
for households. At the same time, the money
supply (M3) trend seems to have decoupled to
some extent from credit trends. One explanation
for this is that an additional counterpart to M3 on
the asset side, besides credit to the private sector,
is credit to governments and purchases of gov-
ernment bonds. We look into this below.
Figure 11: Loans to non-financial corporations
and households vs. M3 annual growth rate (%)
Source: ECB.
The aggregate numbers conceal substantial het-
erogeneity across euro-area countries. Figures 12
and 13 show the growth rate of loans to non-finan-
cial corporations in selected euro-area countries.
The figures document the steep decline in credit
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growth in the countries that had a huge credit
boom before the crisis. It is also very clearly visi-
ble that credit growth rebalanced during 2007-08,
with countries such as Germany, which for a long
time exhibited subdued credit growth, experienc-
ing a significant pick-up in credit.
Figure 12: Bank loans to non-financial
corporations, annual growth rate (%)3
Source: Bruegel based on ECB.
Credit growth recovered after mid-2010 in north-
ern euro-area countries, including France, while
credit growth in southern countries and Ireland
remains subdued. The data do not provide evi-
dence that the LTRO has changed these underly-
ing credit dynamics. Growth of credit to
non-financial corporations in Greece, Ireland, Por-
tugal and Spain remains negative, while in Italy it
approaches negative territory.
The data do not, however, allow us to conclude that
credit growth has been impaired by the lack of
central-bank liquidity. Rather, the data may reflect
weak demand for credit, ie the ongoing deleverag-
ing in the corporate and household sectors, and
credit rationing by weak banking systems. In this
case the response should go beyond providing
abundant liquidity and should address more struc-
tural weaknesses. This may include more forceful
recapitalisation plans and other (euro-area)
measures to restore confidence in the banking
systems.
Interest rates fell dramatically in the euro area for
the corporate and household sectors following the
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. During 2011, inter-
est rates gradually increased and only since
December 2011 have interest rates on loans to
corporations fallen again. The LTRO has thus
helped to improve aggregate interest-rate condi-
tions in the euro area.
A significant dispersion of interest rates can be
observed within the euro area. In Figure 14, we
show the correlation between interest rates for
loans to households for the purchase of homes in
a specific country, and the euro-area rate. As can
be seen, the correlation has reduced markedly,
suggesting that interest-rate conditions across
the euro area have become more heterogenous.
For the early part of the sample, some countries, in
particular Greece, had a lower level of interest-rate
integration. This may be explained by regulatory
and other factors. For the interest rates for the cor-
porate sector, we observe a high degree of inte-
gration, which reduced very significantly recently
(see Figure 15).
Figure 13: Euro area, banks’ interest rates on
loans to non-financial corporations and
households (%)
Figure 14: Financial integration of loans for
house purchases
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Figure 15: Financial integration of corporate
credit loans
Source for Figures 13, 14 and 15: Bruegel based on ECB, MFI
interest rates. Note to Figure 13: Loans to non-financial cor-
porations up to €1 million at floating rate and up to 1 year ini-
tial fixed rate; loans to households for house purchase at
floating rate up to 1 year initial fixed rate. Note to Figure 14:
2-year backward-moving correlation coefficient of interest
rates for house purchase at floating rate and up to 1 year ini-
tial rate fixed (series code 1.2.1.5.) to the euro-area rate.
Note to Figure 15: 2-year backward-looking moving correla-
tion coefficient. Loans up to €1 million at floating rate and up
to 1 year initial rate fixed (series code 1.2.2.8.) to the euro-
area rate.
At the same time, however, interest rate levels
remain favourable in a number of countries in
which one would suspect that problems exist (see
Table 1). In Ireland, for example, it is cheaper to get
a mortgage than in Germany. For mortgages, credit
conditions therefore seem to be still reasonable
across the euro area.
This contrasts with credit interest rate conditions
for corporations (Table 1, lower panel). While they
have improved in most euro-area countries, com-
pared to the pre-crisis level of June 2007, in
Greece and Portugal they have clearly deterio-
rated. Also the relative ranking of interest rates
has markedly changed with interest rates in Bel-
gium, France and Germany now being among the
lowest, while interest rates in Spain – once more
favourable than in France – have now become
clearly less favourable.
4.4 Government bond markets
The LTRO had a very strong and significant effect
on interest-rate conditions in the euro-area gov-
ernment-bond market. The yield curves have
come down on average by more than 1 percent-
age point at the short end and a bit less than 1
percentage point at the long end. The LTRO has
also clearly helped to reduce the abnormal shape
of the yield curve at the short end where yields
were very high. At country level, Bate and Boone
(2012) show that the yield curves for Spanish
and Italian government bonds have been affected,
especially at the short-end.
The impact on the yield curve has been less pro-
nounced for the government bonds of AAA coun-
tries (see Figure 17). In particular at the
short-end, the decrease is less than 0.2 percent-
age points, and the shape of the yield curve was
well behaved before the LTRO. The yield curve data
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Table 1: Banks’ loan interest rates
Loans to households for house purchases, at floating rate and up to 1 year initial fixed rate
EA BE DE IE GR ES FR IT NL AT PT FI
June 2007 5 4.87 5.64 4.95 4.9 5.01 4.37 5.18 5.01 5.19 4.7 4.73
Jan 2009 4.37 4.36 4.97 3.72 4.55 4.8 5.23 4.34 4.74 5.01 4.12 3.18
Dec 2010 2.78 3.12 3.38 3.01 3.65 2.52 3.06 2.52 3.58 2.75 2.96 2.08
Nov 2011 3.43 3.81 3.74 3.12 4.48 3.48 3.64 3.33 4.04 3.1 4.33 2.53
Feb 2012 3.44 3.86 3.55 3.09 3.77 3.54 3.71 3.99 4.01 3.06 4.38 2.27
Loans to non-financial corporations, up to €1 million at floating rate and up to 1 year initial fixed rate
EA BE DE IE GR ES FR IT NL AT PT FI
June 2007 5.53 5.52 6.09 6.19 6.48 5.33 5.39 5.42 5.08 5.1 6.92 5.35
Jan 2009 4.73 4.08 4.55 5.26 5.45 4.93 4.36 4.59 4.31 4.01 7.12 3.71
Dec 2010 3.5 2.63 3.77 3.87 6.34 3.78 2.65 3.18 3.47 2.55 5.92 2.86
Nov 2011 4.34 2.89 3.92 5.29 7.18 4.91 3.2 4.58 3.6 2.93 7.56 3.26
Feb 2012 4.28 2.38 3.56 4.72 7.02 4.96 3.04 4.92 3.3 2.67 7.54 3.2111
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therefore indicates that the LTRO has had a par-
ticularly strong effect on the government-bond
yields of countries with lower credit ratings. Some
of the liquidity in the banking system thus
appears to have been used to buy more of the gov-
ernment bonds of weaker euro-area economies
than of the stronger euro-area economies. The
decrease in spreads could thus be a result of this.
Figure 16: Euro-area yield curve for government
bonds (all issuers)
Source: ECB.
Figure 17: Euro-area yield curve for government
bonds (%, AAA issuers only)
Source: ECB.
An alternative possibility is, however, that the LTRO
has allowed credit conditions in the banking
system to stabilise, thereby increasing financial
stability and the proper functioning of monetary
policy. These better stability prospects may have
led to a reversal in sentiment, thereby reducing
interest rates in the periphery bond markets by
more than in the AAA countries.
To distinguish between these two possibilities, we
look into government bond purchases by mone-
tary and financial institutions (MFIs) in euro-area
countries. The ECB provides statistics on pur-
chases by MFIs in different countries of govern-
ment securities issued by euro-area governments.
Unfortunately, the statistics do not differentiate
between issuers of government securities. The
European Banking Authority stress tests and other
prior experience, however, show that banks tend
to exhibit a significant home bias in their pur-
chases and holdings of government bonds. It
therefore can likely be assumed that more pur-
chases of government securities by Spanish
banks and fewer purchases by German banks,
mean that more Spanish bonds than German
bonds have been bought, especially as other data
indicate that purchases by non-residents have
decreased in weaker countries (Merler and Pisani-
Ferry, 2012a).
Figure 18: Bank holdings of euro-area general
government securities, annual growth rate (%)
Source: Bruegel based on ECB, MFI balance sheets. Note:
northern euro area = Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ger-
many, the Netherlands; southern euro area: Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Portugal and Spain.
For the euro area as a whole, holdings of govern-
ment securities by euro-area banks have
increased since the end of November 2011, from
€1382 billion to €1497 billion, ie by about 8 per-
cent. The aggregate figure conceals significant
heterogeneity. Figure 18 illustrates this by show-
ing significantly different behaviour of banks in
their purchases of government securities across
different countries. At the peak of the crisis in
2009, government bond holdings of southern
euro-area banks increased dramatically, probably
reflecting the lack of demand for funds by the pri-
vate sector and the government sector's strong
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fiscal expansion. The LTRO led again to a dramatic
increase in the buying of government bonds,
which is not visible in northern euro-area coun-
tries. The government bond holdings of Italian, Por-
tuguese and Spanish banks have in particular
increased, by €54 billion, €4 billion and €68 bil-
lion respectively.
Overall, the data suggests that the greatest part
of the additional ECB liquidity ended up in the
deposit facility of the ECB itself. The interbank
market remains stressed but banks' acute fund-
ing needs have been addressed by the LTRO, and
the LTRO was therefore of crucial importance for
the preservation of financial stability. Significant
amounts of the LTRO were used to buy government
securities, leading to a decline in spreads and
yields, and this has also helped to increase finan-
cial stability, even though we have shown that the
LTRO has not improved the solvency conditions of
banks. Relatively little evidence can be found that
the LTRO improved actual credit flows to house-
holds and corporations in countries under finan-
cial stress. This suggests that banks, households
and corporations do not primarily have a liquidity
problem. Instead, the major deleveraging that is
required for the reduction of the debt overhang in
households and corporations may be one of the
principal factors behind weak credit dynamics
(Ahearne and Wolff, 2012). Furthermore, lack of
confidence in the overall construction of Economic
and Monetary Union impairs credit in the weaker
EMU countries (Merler and Pisani-Ferry, 2012b).
5 CONCLUSIONS 
The ECB has, with the recent LTROs, managed a
massive expansion of its balance sheet. This has
been called the euro-area equivalent of quantita-
tive easing, as done by the Fed and the Bank of
England. Large portions of this liquidity, however,
are parked in overnight deposits at the ECB, reduc-
ing its effectiveness for the overall monetary
policy stance.
The main obstacle for the ECB is not the fact that
the Treaty on which it is based places tight limits
on the purchase of government bonds, compared
to those existing in the UK and the US. Rather, the
absence of a banking and fiscal union and the
strong heterogeneity within the euro area reduces
the effectiveness of the instruments the ECB has.
The absence of a common euro-area reference
asset precludes the ECB from exercising a direct
influence over the benchmark yield curve. The
combination of sovereign and banking fragility, in
turn, means that additional liquidity provided to
the banks in the euro area will be used to smooth
the effect of the exit of private funding and the
selective buying of government bonds by banks,
which in turn increases fragility.
The three-year LTRO has been an appropriate
response to a situation of extreme stress among
European financial institutions. As long as the
crisis of confidence continues, however, there are
inherent limits to the LTRO's effectiveness. Addi-
tional ECB liquidity will not improve credit condi-
tions in countries under stress. ECB policy is
rendered less effective by the heterogeneity
across countries and the incomplete fiscal set-up.
The ECB therefore rightly calls for a stronger fiscal
union.13
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ANNEX
The ECB, the Fed and the Bank of England conduct monetary policy in different ways and pursued
different policies to deal with the crisis. To compare them, we reclassified the items presented in the
balance sheet into six macro-categories:
• Repos: including lending to financial institutions
• Purchase of government securities
• Purchase of non-government securities
• Foreign exchange swaps/foreign currency lending to banks
• Other assets
• Other operations, including those new schemes adopted that cannot be easily classified in
another category
Source: Bank of England BANK OF ENGLAND
ITEM IN BALANCE SHEET DESCRIPTION CLASSIFICATION
Short term open market operations Composed by: one-week repos, fine-tuning repos and
repos at other maturity within maintenance period
Repo
Longer-term sterling repo Repo
Ways and Means advances to HM
Government
Other assets
Bonds and other securities acquired via
market transactions
Includes the small foreign exchange reserves that the
Bank of England holds in support of its monetary policy
objective. These are not the UK's official holdings of inter-
national reserves, which are almost entirely held in a
government account administered by Her Majesty's
Treasury (the Exchange Equalisation Account – EEA).
The Bank acts as HMT's agent in the day-to-day man-
agement of the EEA, but the EEA is not on the Bank's bal-
ance sheet. We cannot exclude this item from the
balance sheet because: (i) it is included into the assets
related to monetary policy and (ii) reserves are not the
only component of it. 
Other assets
Other assets
Other Assets includes the government and non-govern-
ment securities purchased by the Bank of England as
well as the USD swaps conducted in agreement with
other central banks. The three components have been
disaggregated and showed separately. The rest is
included in ‘other assets’ as residual.
Government
securities
Non-government
securities
Lending in foreign
currency
Other assets15
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Source: ECB EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK (ECB)
ITEM IN BALANCE SHEET DESCRIPTION CLASSIFICATION
Main refinancing Operations (MRO)
Regular liquidity-providing open market operation executed by the Eurosystem in the form of reverse
transactions. Main refinancing operations are conducted through weekly standard tenders in the
form of reverse transactions and normally have a maturity of one week. 
Repo
Longer-term refinancing operations
(LTRO)
Liquidity providing reverse transactions with a monthly frequency and a maturity of normally three
months.  Repo
Marginal Lending Facility
is a standing facility of the Eurosystem which counterparties may use to obtain overnight liquidity
from a national central bank at a pre-specified interest rate against eligible assets.  Repo
Fine-tuning 
Are open-market operations executed on ad-hoc basis with the aim of managing the liquidity situation in
the market and steering interest rates, in particular in order to smooth the effects on interest rates caused
by unexpected liquidity fluctuations in the market.They are included by the ECB in the category of lend-
ing to EA credit institutions related to monetary policy (item is insignificant)
Repo
Securities held for monetary
purposes
The item is composed by the government bonds purchased under the Securities Market Programme
(SMP) and non-government securities purchased under the Covered Bond Purchase Programme
(CBPP). We disaggregate them and present them separately.
Government securities
Non-government
securities
Claims on euro area residents
denominated in foreign currency 
It is related to the USD liquidity line set up with the FED. The liquidity provided under this temporary
arrangement is identified in the ECB annual report on the liability side (‘Liabilities to non-euro residents
denominated in euro’). On the asset side, the item that matches it is ‘Claims on EA residents in foreign
currency’. It is not included by the ECB in the items related to monetary policy, but we include it as it is
the asset counterpart of the USD swaps. Given that it does not include only USD liquidity swaps (before
2008), we include it as lending to EA institutions in foreign currency.
Lending in foreign
currency
Credit related to margin call
The ECB includes it into the asset related to monetary policy, under lending to financial institutions
but it cannot considered a REPO, so we include it under ‘Other assets’ (the item is however insignif-
icant).
Other assets
Other claims on euro area credit
institutions denominated in euro 
In 2010 the Governing Council decided that the euro-area central banks would make available for lend-
ing bonds bought under the covered bond purchase programme. The ECB implemented these lending
operations through matched repurchase transactions, whereby amounts received under repurchase
agreements are fully and simultaneously reinvested with the same counterparty under a reverse repur-
chase agreement which is actually recorded under this ‘Other claims on euro area credit institutions
denominated in euro’. The ECB does not include it in assets related to monetary policy but being con-
nected to the CBPP we include it as ‘Other assets’.
Other assets
Claims on non-euro area residents
denominated in euro 
As at 31 December 2010 this item consisted of a claim on a non-euro area central bank in connec-
tion with an agreement on repurchase transactions established with the ECB. Under this agree-
ment the non-euro area central bank can borrow euro against eligible collateral in order to support
its domestic liquidity-providing operations. It is not included by ECB in the assets related to mone-
tary policy and it does not concern the EA, we therefore exclude it.
Other assets
General Government debt denomi-
nated in euro
Outstanding non-marketable claims on euro area governments stemming from before 1 January
1994, from which date onwards Eurosystem NCBs were no longer allowed to provide credit facilities
to governments or make direct purchases of debt instruments from governments. This debt will be
redeemed by governments in due course.
Being a residual from
pre-1994 and not related
to monetary policy, it
has been excluded
Claims on non-euro area residents
denominated in foreign currency 
Represents the main FX reserves of the ECB. It is composed by: (i) receivables from the IMF and (ii)
balances with banks and securities investments, external loans and other external assets (foreign
currency assets other than gold and SDR holdings with non-euro area residents). 
Excluded
Gold Excluded
Other Assets
Collective item that includes items in the course of settlement, coins of the euro area if an NCB is not
the legal issuer, tangible and intangible fixed assets and other financial assets. Other financial assets
comprises participating interests and investments in subsidiaries; equities held for strategic/policy
reasons, securities, including equities, and other financial instruments and balances (e.g. fixed-term
deposits and current accounts), held as an earmarked portfolio: reverse repo transactions with credit
institutions in connection with the management of securities portfolios. This item also contains reval-
uation differences arising on off-balance-sheet instruments and accruals and prepaid expenditure.
Excluded
Securities other than those held for
monetary purposes
Recorded at market value, they present considerable valuation effects Excluded16
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Source: FED Cleveland FEDERAL RESERVE (FED)
ITEM IN BALANCE SHEET DESCRIPTION CLASSIFICATION
REPO Repurchase agreements reflect some of the Federal Reserve's temporary open market operations.  Repo
Credit to depository institutions
Traditionally, the Fed has provided healthy banks with short-term credit through short-term loans at its
discount window-most typically over one business day. Such loans are usually secured with very
high-quality collateral. 
Repo
Term-auction credit (TAF)
To overcome the stigma problem of the Federal Reserve's Discount Window, the Fed unveiled the Term
Auction Facility (TAF) in December 2007. The TAF auctions funds to depository institutions against
the same kinds of collateral that can be used to secure funds at the discount window. But because
healthy banks are just as likely to participate in the auction as those in trouble, individual banks are
not assumed to be under distress just because they use the facility.
Repo
Currency Swaps
At the same time it introduced the TAF, the Federal Reserve announced it would extend currency swap
lines with the European Central Bank and the Swiss National Bank. The swap lines provide these cen-
tral banks with dollars, which they can use to supply liquidity to credit markets in their jurisdictions that
are based on dollars. 
FX swaps
Credit extensions (PDCF)
To deal with the shortage of collateral, the Federal Reserve introduced the Primary Dealer Credit Facil-
ity (PDCF). The FED’s discount window is reserved to depository institutions: the PDCF authorised the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York to create a similar lending facility for primary dealers (mostly invest-
ment banks). In effect, it created a temporary ‘discount window’ for some of the largest non-depos-
itory institutions, collateralised by a broad range of investment-grade debt securities. Even if it is
an extraordinary operation, we consider it to be comparable with the discount window and therefore
include it in Repo.
Repo
Long Term treasury purchases Purchase of
government securities
Mortgage-backed securities
To help reduce the cost and increase the availability of credit for the purchase of houses, on Novem-
ber 25, 2008, the Federal Reserve announced that it would buy MBS guaranteed by the Government
Sponsored Enterprises Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae. Given that these agencies are Gov-
ernment Sponsored Enterprises, we include this into ‘Purchases of government securities’.
Source: Federal Reserve System Monthly Report on Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance
Sheet, December 2009.
Purchase of
government securities
Federal Agency debt securities
These represent the purchase of direct obligations of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home
Loan Banks. Again, we include them in ‘Purchases of government bonds’.
Purchase of
government securities
Commercial Paper Funding Facility
It was introduced to support the commercial paper market. Commercial paper is short-term (overnight
to 270-day maturity) debt issued by corporations, often to manage cash needs in the short run, such
as payroll obligations. It is most often unsecured, but in before the crisis many financial institutions
secured their paper (called ‘asset-backed commercial paper’) with their holdings of long-term assets,
most notably mortgage-backed bonds. Uncertain credit markets in the fall of 2008 led to concerns that
companies that had issued unsecured paper or asset-backed commercial paper would be unable to
roll it over into new debt. At the time the CPFF was announced, the market would only allow paper to
be rolled over one night and at very high interest rates. The CPFF is intended to alleviate the rollover risk.
The facility purchases three-month unsecured and asset-backed commercial paper carrying credit
ratings in the top tier. 
Purchase of
government securities
Traditional securities holdings
Represents the stock of securities traditionally held by Federal Reserve Banks in connection with its
open market operations (conducted via outright purchases or sales of securities). Other assets
Other FED Assets Other assets
Securities Lent to dealers (TSLF)
The TSLF is a 28-day facility that will offer Treasury to the Federal Reserve’s primary dealers in exchange
for other program-eligible collateral. Intended to promote liquidity in the financing markets for Treas-
ury and other collateral and thus to foster the functioning of financial markets more generally. It is not
directly cash in exchange for a security, but rather a liquid security in exchange for a less liquid
security. Idea is to deal with shortage of collateral. Therefore we cannot classify it as a repo and
include it in ‘Other Operations’.
(Note: In the US primary dealers are those bank, broker/dealer or other financial institution that are able
to trade directly with the U.S. Federal Reserve (eg underwriting new government debt). These dealers
must meet certain liquidity and quality requirements.)
Other operations
Credit Extension (AIG)
Under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, the Federal Reserve was able to extend loans directly
to a distressed financial institution, namely AIG. The loan is collateralised by all of AIG’s assets, and
the U.S. government received a 77.9 percent equity interest in AIG.
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Asset-backed Commercial Paper
Money Market Mutual Fund
Liquidity Facility (AMLF)
Introduced to help MMMFs that held asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) meet investors’
demands for redemptions, and to foster liquidity in the ABCP market and money market more
generally.
Under the programme, the Federal Reserve provided loans to a number of financial institutions.
These institutions used the funding to purchase eligible ABCP from MMMFs. Borrowers under the
AMLF, therefore, served as conduits in providing liquidity to MMMFs, and the MMMFs were the
primary beneficiaries of the AMLF. AMLF loans were fully collateralized by the ABCP purchased by the
AMLF borrower. 
Other operations
Term Asset backed securities
(TALF)
The program provides both liquidity and capital to the consumer and small business loan asset-backed
securities markets. The Fed lent money against asset-backed securities that were backed by student,
auto, credit card, and SBA loans. The Treasury Department provided $100 billion in credit protection
from its Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to the TALF-a cushion against losses on the ABS collateral. 
Other operations
Maiden Lane 1/2/3
The Maiden Lane LLCs are tied to pools of assets that the Fed has lent against to stabilise specific
companies and asset classes.
Maiden Lane 1
The Maiden Lane LLC consisted of a loan to J.P. Morgan backed by a pool of securities that were
obtained from the acquisition of Bear Stearns in March 2008.The pool consisted primarily of
investment-grade residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities. 
Maiden Lane 2
Maiden Lane II purpose traces back to AIG. Federal Reserve extended a loan to AIG to meet cash
redemptions and stabilise the value of the mortgage-backed securities. The loan collateral (mort-
gage bonds) is represented in the Maiden Lane II vehicle.
Maiden Lane 3
Maiden Lane III was created after billions were loaned to AIG. The insurer had extended credit protec-
tion-in the form of credit default swaps-on billions of dollars' worth of collateralized debt obligations
(CDOs). When AIG's credit rating was downgraded, the credit default swap holders ordered collateral
postings at levels that threatened the company's solvency. Beginning in late November 2008, the
Fed loaned funds to Maiden Lane III so that it could begin to purchase the CDOs upon which the
credit default swap contracts had been written (the CDOs also serve as collateral for the Fed
loan).